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ABSTRACT 
Political solutions have been found for several longstanding conflicts in 
Africa in 2003 - in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Burundi. 
The political arrangements in these countries may not necessarily usher in 
permanent peace and stability, but they at least afford an opportunity to work 
toward such goals. Unfortunately, this is not the case for Somalia, where 
anarchy, violence and chaos have prevailed for over 15 years. A national 
reconciliation conference - the 14th of its kind – sat in Nairobi for two years and 
finally formed a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in August, 2004. As 
usual, the outcome of the conference was not welcomed, either by warlords or 
later on by Islamic clerics in Somalia. Nonetheless, despite institutional 
obstacles, the Inter Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) has 
continued to press their intention to send peacekeepers to Somalia to reinstall 
the fragile transitional government against the wishes of the Islamic Courts 
Council (ICC). This thesis examines the possible strategies that IGAD should 
consider using in its intended mission of supporting the restoration of the 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Somalia has been without a government for over 15 years following the 
overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. During this period, many incidents 
occurred in Somalia which have devastated the living conditions of the Somalis 
and also made life difficult for the neighbouring countries.  In the summer of 
1991, fighting broke out between supporters of different clan factions who were 
jostling for control of the country.  Bloody conflict turned the capital, Mogadishu, 
into a city of chaotic violence.  Factions sought to control economically strategic 
areas, such as airports and seaports, as well as Somalia’s limited fertile 
farmland. Enjoying military superiority over the traditionally disadvantaged and 
despised farmers of the Jubba valley, the clan militias seized the farmland 
without much resistance.  The chaos in Somalia’s “breadbasket” would be 
responsible for the famine which occurred in 1992.  Many people died while 
800,000 sought refuge in neighbouring countries (Griffith, 2003).  The resulting 
catastrophe was to be the impetus for the ill-fated humanitarian mission by the 
UN.  After failing in both the humanitarian mission and the state-building attempt 
that followed, the UN forces left Somalia in March 1995.  
The violence continued but did not escalate. In fact, some regions of 
southern Somalia began to experiment with alternate ways of restoring order to 
their communities, namely through Islamic law. Tribunals enforcing Islamic law 
(sharia) begun to spring up in northern Mogadishu. Sharia has a reputation for 
severity among Westerners, especially due to incidents in Nigeria, Sudan and 
Indonesia involving severe punishments and human rights abuses.  
Throughout the 1990s, several peace conferences were held to address 
the warfare in Somalia.  Regrettably, they were largely unsuccessful. A peace 
conference held in Djibouti in 2000, however, sparked international optimism 
when it yielded a three-year plan for governing Somalia.  The triumph of the 
peace conference was the formation of a Somali Transitional National 
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Government (TNG).  Alas, the optimism was premature.  The TNG’s authority 
was not widely accepted within Somalia and the new government faced constant 
opposition and was never able to rule effectively.  
Another series of peace talks began in 2002.  These talks, sponsored by 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and based in Kenya, 
eventually produced the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). About 365 
Somali delegates participated in the talks.  In October 2004, Abdullah Yusuf 
Ahmed was elected interim President for a five-year period.  His new government 
remained in Kenya, however, as much of Somalia, particularly Mogadishu, was 
unsafe. In July 2005, the new government relocated to the Somali towns of 
Baidoa and Jowhar in western Somalia. Soon after relocation, the TFG was 
plagued by internal disagreements. Specifically, the President was at 
loggerheads with some warlords and government officials over where his 
administration should be based. The President and the Prime Minister, Ali 
Mohammed Gedi, were opposed to moving to Mogadishu, citing security 
concerns and, as a result, settled in Baidoa. The TFG’s Speaker of Parliament, 
Sharif Adan, and some government officials wanted the government to be 
established in Mogadishu. The warlords, on the other hand, did not recognize the 
TFG as a legitimate entity and vowed to destroy it.  While these events were 
happening, another anti-government group was slowly surfacing: the Islamic 
Court Council (ICC).  
The ICC entered the power struggle and displaced the Mogadishu 
warlords in June 2006. The ICC has been linked to a fundamentalist Somali 
group, al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI or "Islamic Unity"), which is believed to have ties 
to al-Qaeda.  U.S. intelligence agencies have indicated that al-Qaeda has used 
Somalia as a regional base of operations, including preparations for the 1998 
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (Philips, 2002). As of this writing, 
Somali power politics was featuring two opposing groups: the internationally 
recognized TFG and the aggressive ICC. 
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The situation in Somalia is a concern, not only for IGAD, but also for the 
African Union (AU), the UN and the international community. The AU has a share 
of responsibility for ensuring stability and development in Africa.  Through its 
regional economic body in the Horn of Africa, IGAD, the AU has a duty to ensure 
a functional government is established in Somalia.  Needless to say, this is an 
enormous task for IGAD.  
Currently, IGAD has a plan to send an ad hoc peacekeeping force to help 
resettle the TFG, and some IGAD countries have been put on notice to provide 
troops to deploy to Somalia to aid and assist the TFG. Yet, in spite of the best 
intentions, it is unclear what strategies IGASOM will use to enable it to achieve 
its mission.  
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
This study seeks to suggest a possible solution to the current Somali 
crisis. In particular, the study looks at possible strategies that can be adopted by 
IGASOM in its expected mission of restoring the Somalia TFG.  The scope of 
these strategies is centred on weakening the ICC while at the same time 
empowering the feeble TFG.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In conducting this analysis, the study addressed the following questions: 
1. What are the realities in Somalia? 
• Recent past; and 
• Current situation. 
2. Who are the actors and how are they influencing the dynamics of 
Somali conflicts?  
3. Why is it important to restore a functioning government in Somalia? 
4. What strategies should IGASOM bring to bear to help resolve 
Somalia problems? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The research methods employed in this thesis include the use of primary 
and secondary literature as well as personal interviews.  In addition, I’ve broken 
the problem down into the main areas on which IGASOM should concentrate in 
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order to be successful in achieving goals in Somalia.  This thesis first seeks to 
identify the present problems of achieving peace and stability in Somalia. This 
requires a review of Somalia’s recent past. After identifying the problems, I will 
follow with a discussion about possible solutions.  Lastly, I detail some potential 
ways in which IGASOM could plan and organize with a view to helping resolve 
Somalia’s problems.   
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This present chapter is a brief introduction of my thesis; it lays out the 
general problem with a brief reference to the key players in the Somalia crisis. 
Chapter II highlights the Somali culture and social/welfare system. Also 
discussed is the character of the Somalis, often considered very aggressive, and 
why war and feuding in Somalia are so prevalent. Chapter II also touches on 
activities that occurred in Somalia immediately before and after Siad Barre was 
ousted from power.  Chapter III is an analysis of factors that may have 
contributed to current Somali problems. Both internal and external actors, who 
have played a significant role in the current conflicts, are highlighted. Chapter IV 
follows with a discussion of the attempts by African nations to solve armed 
conflicts within the continent. The discussion begins with the broad strategy of 
solving conflicts in Africa, which the AU intends to carry out.  Chapter IV also 
discusses efforts taken by East African countries to try solving the conflicts in 
Somalia. Major challenges that the East African region is facing in dealing with 
peace and security matters are also reviewed.  Next, in Chapter V, I analyze the 
strategies which IGAD, while coming to the aid of the TFG, could adopt in order 
to defeat the ICC. In doing so, I have adopted IGAD’s considerations that the 
TFG is the legitimate government of Somalia while the ICC is not. Lastly, Chapter 
VI summarizes the key issues discussed throughout my thesis with an emphasis 
on strategies for success in Somalia. In closing, I offer recommendations to help 
restore the TFG.  
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II. THE CULTURE AND MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Somalia provides social scientists with an interesting natural experiment to 
test the conditions under which order can be provided in a decentralized setting. 
Somalia has been without a central government for over 15 years. Today, the 
newly formed Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is under threat of 
collapsing and joining the ranks of previously failed governments. To understand 
why Somalia is prone to conflicts, one needs to understand how the Somali 
people relate to one another. It also helps to have some knowledge of Somalia’s 
complex clan system.  
There is a Somali proverb that says, "Men differ in three things: first, they 
differ in their ability to forget past grievances; second, they differ in their ability to 
concentrate on issues relevant to the present; and thirdly, they differ in their 
ability to foresee the future." Ali (2000) interprets this proverb to mean, "Let us 
accept conflict as natural and agree to transform it peacefully in order to coexist 
together." But, are conflicts really natural to Somalis? Why have other pastoral 
communities in the Horn of Africa managed to resolve differences peacefully, but 
not the Somalis? More specifically, why do Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti enjoy 
relative peace, while Somalia does not? These are questions that I intend to 
answer in this chapter. I will analyze the unique character of the Somali people. 
At the same time, I will try to shed light on the phenomenon which occurs when 
Somalis meet. When meeting for the first time, Somalis don’t ask: Where are you 
from? Rather, they ask: Whom are you from? Could one be right to suggest that 
genealogy is to Somalis as an address is to Americans? 
B. SOMALI CULTURE 
1. The People 
Primarily a pastoral people, the Somalis are thought to have migrated into 
northern Kenya and southern Somalia from the lake regions of the southern 
Ethiopian highlands. The proto-Sam, as they are called by anthropologists, 
migrated further into the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and northern Somalia in 
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search of water and pasture lands. This expansion was marked by the largely 
violent expulsion of native people. What followed was the consequent 
establishment of a single cultural nation in continuous occupation of a vast 
though impoverished territory. The proto-Sam came to be known as the Samaal, 
or Samaale, a clear reference to the mythical father figure of the main Somali 
clan-families, whose name gave rise to the term Somali (Laitin & Samatar, 1987, 
p. 6). 
The geography of Somalia defined the evolution of the Somalis into two 
sub-cultures.  The Somalis of the southern interriverine country adapted to their 
physical environment by becoming agrarians. They also engaged in slavery. 
While some communities among them originated from Tanzania, some people 
believe that the southern interriverine Somalis were the resident indigenous non-
Somali people. Conversely, the Somalis who settled outside the interriverine 
areas became herders, raising camels, sheep, and goats: they migrated as 
necessary to keep their herds near water and good pasture lands. 
Although all Somalis profess strong allegiance to Islam, they hold stronger 
primary loyalties to self, family and clan, in that order. As we will see in the next 
paragraph, when analyzing the dynamics of conflicts among the Somali clan 
families, it is prudent to note that genealogy among ethnic Somalis constitutes 
the heart of the Somali social system.  As Lewis (2002) observes, it is the basis 
of the collective Somali inclination toward internal fission and internecine conflict, 
as well as of the Somalis' sense of being distinct, which mobilizes their defensive 
attitude and hostile stereotypes; a consciousness of others which borders on 
downright xenophobia (p. 11). 
2. The Somali Clans 
Somalis are not a unitary people, but rather a grouping of broad clan 
federations divided by some linguistic differences and clan conflicts. The Somali 
clan system has two main lineage lines, the Samale and the Sab, which break 
into six major clan-families: Digil, Rahanweyn, Darod, Hawiye, Isaq, and Dir. In 
genealogical terms, the Digil and Rahanweyn clan families belong to the Sab, 
while the Darod, Hawiye, Isaq, and Dir belong to the Samale. Although the 
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families are not strictly territorially defined, they do tend to occupy distinct 
geographical locations, (i.e., the Isaq and the Dir in the north; the Digil and 
Rahanweyn in the agricultural areas in the south; the Hawiye in and around 
Mogadishu and the Darod in the south and in the north (see Figure 1)). The 
differentiation between Sab and Samale is reflected in the basic contrast 
between the nomadic pastoralism of the Samale and the sedentary farming of 
the Sab. Somalis consider the name Sab to be derogatory in nature. Just as in 
Rwanda where the Tutsi considers themselves superior to Hutus, in Somalia the 
Samaale consider themselves superior to the Sab, who have lowered 
themselves by their reliance on agriculture and a willingness to assimilate 
foreigners into their clans. 
 
Figure 1.   Somali clan families and major sub-clans. Retrieved August 17, 
2006 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Somalia_ethnic_grps_2002.jpg 
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Within the clan-family, lineage group members are divided into clans, 
which represent more significant aspects of social organization and identification. 
Clans are, in turn, further subdivided into sub-clans, primary lineages groups, 
and, at the base of this system, diya-paying groups. Diya is compensation paid 
by a person who has injured or killed another person, while the diya-paying group 
is a cluster of close kinsmen, united by a specific contractual alliance. Clans are 
the most binding and frequently mobilized cooperating group of a few small 
lineages reckoning descent back four to eight generations to the common 
founder. The diya-paying groups have a membership of several hundred to a few 
thousand men. The group’s terms stipulate that they should collectively pay and 
receive blood-compensation in the settlement of feuds (Lewis, 2002, p. 11). This 
cultural practice resembles the mar dushmani (death enmity) of the Kohistani 
community in Thull, Afghanistan. As Keiser (2002) explains in his book Friend by 
Day, Enemy by Night, the Koshitani men would usually share death enmity, and 
the aggrieved would try to kill his enemy unless the enemy sued for peace, which 
require taking risks. This required the man suing for peace to formally request his 
dushman to accept compensation instead of seeking revenge. There was no 
guarantee that such requests would always be accepted. Even in cases where 
truces were accepted, the rule did not require that the dushman abandon 
vengeance (Keiser, 2002, p.  21).  
Throughout Somali history, the security of an individual and his property 
has depended on his membership in his diya-paying group.  In general, a 
Somali’s primary loyalty lies with his diya-paying group, then with his clan, and 
finally with the kindred clans of the clan-family. However, any lineages acting as 
a separate political unit are capable of functioning as a diya-paying group, albeit 
on a short-term basis. Though more prevalent among the nomads, it therefore 
appears that the Somalis are an aggressive society where war, feud, and fighting 
are common. As Lewis (2002,) explains, “... the nomadic Somali are a warlike 
people, driven by poverty of their resources to intense competition for access to 
water and grazing"(p. 11). While clanship promotes short-term and unstable 
political alliances, it also acts as the primary source of stability and cohesion in 
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Somali society. Clan networks provide a means of identification and support that 
are vital given insecure environmental, social, and political conditions. In general, 
the clan genealogical system functions as a pastoral mode of adaptation to a 
harsh physical environment. Although Islam is a strong unifying and defining 
force in Somali life, it is considered of secondary importance to the lineage and 
warrior tradition.   
3. The “Gun Culture” 
Many of Africa’s pastoral groups are threatened by the proliferation of 
small arms that makes conflicts with their neighbors more lethal. A good example 
is the Karimojong group of northeast Uganda who for centuries relied on 
traditional weapons when engaged in cattle-rustling and clan warfare. Such 
fighting claimed relatively few lives and was generally settled by elders. There 
were very few guns. By the late 1990s, there were an estimated 150,000 guns, 
mostly AK-47s, in the hands of Karimojong (Mburu, 2002, p. 8). Ownership of 
such weapons conferred political, social, and economic status. Oftentimes, an 
AK-47 became part of the brideprice. Not surprisingly, cattle rustling and clan 
warfare became more lethal. As a result, the Karimojong society not only is less 
cohesive, but also has become part of the arc of conflict that stretches 
throughout the Horn of Africa.  
Like the Karamojong, Somalis had access to firearms from Arabs far 
earlier than other communities in the region. During Siad Barre’s regime, more 
weapons found their way into Somalia from the Soviet Union. It is estimated that 
the former Somali army had abandoned more than 40,000 weapons in the early 
1990s that were then available to any Somali. These guns have brought 
significant changes in the culture and social status of the Somali. In an interview 
with Colonel H. I. Hussein (2006), a Kenya Army officer who concentrates on 
Somalia, Col. Hussein referred to this epidemic as the “Gun Culture.” He further 
explained how these guns have changed Somali social culture and lifestyle 
claiming, “anyone with a gun [used to be] considered special and had privileges 
in the community. Not only for him, but also his wife.” For instance, when women 
would queue to draw water, the woman whose husband had a gun would bypass 
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the line and draw water before anybody else. Equally, after a successful cattle 
raid, the raiders with firearms would get a bigger share of the stolen stock than 
those without. 
Just as the Karamojong would pay bride price with a weapon, for Somalis, 
Hussein (2006) asserts, “during marriage ceremonies, a bridegroom would be 
required to give his father-in-law a gun or he will risk losing the bride.”  
Hussein (2006) emphasized that in the Somali communities, “loss of a rifle 
is mourned and when a clansman has been killed in a clash, the first question 
people would ask is whether the rifle of the dead person has been recovered.” 
The bereaved clan would then demand the firearm that had been used to kill their 
clansman, as compensation (Diya). Otherwise, there was risk of “war.”  
These few examples clearly indicate the influence of firearms. Due to the 
easy accessibility of firearms, the Somali culture has been influenced to the 
extent that the value of guns has become so great that future disarmament 
appears highly unlikely.  
C. MODERN HISTORY OF SOMALIA 
1. Post-Independent Somalia 
On July 1, 1960, the nation of Somalia was formed from the union of 
British Somaliland and the Italian trust territory of southern Somalia. The new 
government was dominated by the Somali Youth League (SYL), the pro-
independence movement. The atmosphere at the time was nationalistic. The 
mood of both national leaders and intellectuals was that traditional tribal 
structures were destructive to national unity, and must be abolished. Moreover, 
they believed the Somali state should govern all Somalis, even those outside its 
current boundaries. Thus, their hope was that the French Territory of the Afars 
and Issas (later Djibouti), the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, and the Northern 
Frontier District of Kenya would eventually be incorporated into the nation of 
Somalia (see Figure 2). However, despite the appearance of solidarity, there 
were significant differences between British Somaliland, the area which later 




Figure 2.   The Greater Somalia. Retrieved August 11, 2006 from 
http://www.hiiraan.com/op/eng/2005/dec/Hamid%20Masheye201205.htm 
 
The young democracy rapidly deteriorated into a mechanism for 
competitive rent-seeking and corruption. Somalia became effectively a one-party 
state as “opposition” politicians moved to join the dominant SYL after each 
election. The last democratic administration (1967-1969, wherein Shermaarke 
was the President and Mohamed Haji Egal the Prime Minister) was marked by 
open theft from the treasury, electoral fraud, and violence. On October 15, 1969, 
President Shermaarke was killed by his bodyguard, who was a member of a 
lineage said to have been badly treated by the President (Lewis, 2002, p. 206). 
The Prime Minister, Egal, was out of the country during this incident. Six days 
later, on October 21, 1969, the military deposed the civilian government in a coup 
d’etat and installed the Army Commander, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre, 
as President.  
2. The Rise and Fall of Siad Barre 
From 1969 to 1991, Somalia was a dictatorship. Any hopes for 
improvement under the military rule of Siad Barre's Supreme Revolutionary 
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Council (SRC) were soon to be dashed. The distinctive features of Barre's reign 
were the extent of militarization first under the Soviet Union, in return for 
substantial military assistance, then U.S. sponsorship, and lastly the 
centralization of power in Barre's own hands. The negative features of the Barre 
regime included economic mismanagement, dependency on military aid, high 
external debt, and repressive governance. There was also the barely disguised 
hegemony of the Darod clan-family in the so-called Ministry Of Defense (MOD) 
alliance, an acronym which stood for Marehan (Siad Barre’s clan), Ogaden (the 
clan of Siad Barre’s mother), and Dulbahante (the clan of Siad Barre’s son-in-
law, Colonel Ahmad Sulayman Abdullah, who headed the National Security 
Service (NSS)). This alliance administered the state apparatus (Prunier, 1995, p. 
5). This was despite the official campaigns condemning tribalism that Barre 
initiated in 1971.  
Despite the atmosphere of fear and intimidation that had developed by the 
mid-1970s, many Somalis supported the government, especially because it 
promised to unite all Somalis in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti in a Greater 
Somalia. In keeping with this objective, Somali troops invaded the mostly Somali 
Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1977. The Soviet Union withdrew its support from 
Somalia and backed Ethiopia. Eventually, Somalia lost the war. After this point, 
intellectuals and other elites became increasingly embittered toward the regime. 
The political manipulation of clanship was a central feature of the Barre 
regime. As competition for control of state resources intensified between the 
different clan factions, from the late 1970s onwards, Barre faced a situation of 
combined crises on military and political fronts as opposition movements began 
to co-operate. The Majerteen-dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front 
(SSDF) based in the north-east of the country was formed in the late 1970s. The 
Isaq-affiliated Somali National Movement (SNM) in the north-west was formed in 
the Gulf states and UK in the early 1980s. Both groups were singled out for 
persecution by Barre's MOD alliance (Prunier, July 1995, p. 5). 
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Throughout the 1980s, Barre’s hold on power weakened, as he brazenly 
attempted to incite one clan against another. Clans viewed as recalcitrant were 
severely punished. However, these tactics failed to postpone his fall for more 
than a few years. Instead, they created indelible passions and suspicions that 
would rend the country apart after its collapse. The turning point in the armed 
opposition to the dictatorship of Siad Barre came in 1988. In that year, after 
suffering a major defeat in the war against the Eritrean independence movement, 
Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam decided to make peace with Siad Barre 
in order to free his troops, which were still involved in the aftermath of the conflict 
with Somalia. A peace agreement between these two leaders meant that 
Mengistu’s forces could now concentrate on the Eritrean front while Siad Barre’s 
forces could be safely ranged against the SNM. In this agreement, Siad Barre 
secretly agreed to give up Somalia’s irredentist claims to the Ogaden. As Simons 
(1996, p. 78) put it, “when this finally became public, it became the thin end of the 
wedge between Siad Barre and members of his mother’s Ogaden clan.” As for 
the Issaq, by pre-empting a strike by Barre in 1988, the SNM briefly took control 
of Hargeisa and Burao in the northwest.  The government counter-attacked and 
heavily bombed the towns, causing the SNM to withdraw. Thousands of civilians 
were killed. Non-MOD elements of the national army began to desert and form 
their own clan-based organizations. The Hawiye-based United Somali Congress 
(USC) was formed in 1989. These three opposition groups, including the 
Ogaden-affiliated Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), converged on Mogadishu in 
January 1991 and ousted Siad Barre’s regime. As Barre fled the capital on 
January 27, 1991, the dissolution of the Somali state accelerated.  
3. The Dissolution of the Somali State 
From the fall of Siad Barre’s regime to the present day, several events 
have occurred in Somalia. Griffiths (2003) groups these events into four 
distinctive phases. The first phase was marked by the most intense conflict. This 
was between 1991-1992 when the different clan factions fought for control of 
land and resources in southern Somalia. This resulted in the devastation of the 
interriverine areas, consequently causing famine and the disruption of farming 
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and livestock production. Increasing numbers of refugees left the country for 
neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia at that time: the number of Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) increased dramatically. In contrast, the 1991 formation of 
independent Somaliland in the northwest created an enclave of reconstruction 
and relative peace.  
Phase Two was centered on UN interventions, which lasted from 1993-
1995. This phase was illuminated by localized conflicts, specifically around 
Mogadishu. The humanitarian objectives of the interventions were clouded by the 
UN’s ambiguous goals and rules of engagement. The UN’s role in “nation 
building” became a rallying point for united Somali opposition. Somalis continued 
to flee the country as internal displacement became routine/common in particular 
regions of the country. Having failed in their mission, the UN troops left Somalia 
in 1995.  
The third phase was the post-intervention phase. This lasted from 1995 to 
2000 and witnessed the emergence of regional administrations and the 
continued dissolution of the Somali state. As conflict continued in different 
regions of the country, internal displacement and steady refugee flows increased. 
Puntland in the northeast declared itself a regional administration in 1998. 
Although not popularly recognized as an autonomous region, Jubaland declared 
itself autonomous in 1998.   
Finally, the fourth phase. This began in 2000 with the establishment of the 
Transitional National Government (TNG) in Arta, Djibouti, under the auspices of 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Key warlords' 
opposition to the legitimacy of the TNG resulted in conflict and population 
displacement in particular areas in the south. By contrast, the process of 
reconstruction continued in Somaliland and Puntland. The TNG was succeeded 
by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was formed in October 
2004 after two years of peace and a reconciliation conference held under the 




One cannot discuss the intricacies of Somalia without paying attention to 
the centrality of the clan in Somali culture, and how, to a certain extent, it has 
enabled the Somali conflict. To briefly describe the essentials of Somalis’ 
traditional polity, it’s reasonable to argue that it depends, as in any other non-
industrialized case, on a sense of collectivism rather than individualism. 
Nevertheless, it also has its own characteristics.  
Kinship represents the only insurance for pre-capitalized nations. The 
Somalis believe that the clan system is the safeguard that makes them stronger 
against other nomads. Such a belief gives to the Somalis a cascading lineage 
identity, a lineage based on a series of stages. In Somali terms: "Myself against 
my family, my family against other families of my clan, my clan against all other 
clans, and all the Somalis against the rest of the world."  
In this chapter, I have described the Somali way of life and indicated what 
is acceptable to a Somali. Additionally, I have briefly narrated the modern history 
of Somalia, describing some of the events that have led to the current conflicts. 
From here, I will move my discussion in the next chapter towards analyzing the 
complexity and dynamism in the current context. I will analyze how internal and 
external actors have influenced the conflicts in Somalia from the fall of Siad Barre 
to the present date.  
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III. CONFLICT DYNAMICS IN CONTEMPORARY SOMALIA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Various groups, to include the international community, have declared that 
a lasting peace in Somalia, as in the Middle East and other parts of the world, will 
be achieved only through addressing the root causes of the conflicts. But as yet, 
there is no general consensus as to what these root causes are. Are Somali 
conflicts caused by the warlords, the warmongers (who finance the wars), the 
government (TFG) or the Islamic fundamentalists? Or, are external powers to 
blame for these conflicts? What outsiders have forgotten, or perhaps never 
known, is what constitutes the lived experience which motivates the actors in 
Somali conflicts. The Somalia conflict is frequently presented as either the 
continuation of an age-old confrontation between “cultures” defined by blood-
lines (clans), or the consequence of an artificial division imposed by colonial 
powers. Clearly, it is worth reminding external observers of the importance of 
historical data influencing the actions of Somalis today. It is necessary to focus 
on the political realities of the country, because it is these realities, more than 
abstract ideas, which influence the current political situation.  
Somalia has been engulfed in confusion arising from factional-clan 
differences. The crisis started immediately after the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre. 
Since his overthrow, no central government has emerged. This was the result of 
clan animosity, leadership wrangles, easy accessibility of arms, lack of 
commitment to a negotiated settlement and external interference. Failure by 
factional leaders to agree on the formation of a central government and the 
unilateral declaration of independence by Somaliland (formally British 
Somaliland), under the leadership of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of the Somali 
National Movement (SNM), followed by Puntland under Abdullahi Yussuf of the 
Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), compounded the problem. Unlike 
most of the south, these regions enjoy some semblance of stability.  
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In the preceding chapter, I discussed various issues regarding the culture 
and modern history of Somalia. In the present chapter, I will attempt to analyze 
factors that may have contributed to current Somali problems. In closing, I will 
offer possible solutions to solving these problems.  
B. INTERNAL FACTORS AND ACTORS 
1. The Tribe and Clan Factor 
Popular descriptions of the war in Somalia frequently make use of the 
words “tribe” and “clan” interchangeably, usually as units of kinship and descent. 
Political affiliation is, thus, represented as being based on, or organized along 
lines of, primal blood relationships. Yet, “tribe,” in administrative and 
anthropological usage in most African countries, is a political term. On the other 
hand, “clan” represents membership of a birth or descent group, relevant mainly 
in determining degrees of relationship in matters of marriage. A tribe is the 
largest unit of political combination of smaller affiliated sections. But, unlike many 
other countries in Africa such as Kenya and its 42 tribes, the Somalis appear to 
outsiders to be a homogeneous community formed of six clan-families with a 
common culture, language and way of life. Even so, Somalia has more 
internecine problems than Kenya. How is this possible? One answer to this 
question might have to do with the lack of relationships between many tribes. 
People within a tribe do not necessarily claim direct common descent or kinship 
links with each other. Below are two examples of how the clan factor has affected 
the Somali conflict. 
a. Hawiye-Darod Rivalry 
Since its independence in 1960, Somalia has been ruled 
predominantly by members of the Darod clan-family. The first President of 
Somalia, Aadan Abdallah Usmaan, was from the Hawiye clan-family. He ruled 
Somalia for seven years and was defeated in the July 1967 general elections by 
his former Prime Minister, Abdirashid Ali Shermaarke. President Shermaarke 
was from the Darod clan-family. His rule was characterized by palpable 
corruption and tribal nepotism, a recipe for growing dissatisfaction within the 
population. After Shermaarke’s assassination, the Prime Minister, Mahammad 
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Ibrahim Egal, who was out of the country during this incident, returned quickly to 
arrange for the selection of a new President. His choice was also a Darod clan-
family member. Feeling that the Prime Minister’s choice would not improve the 
deteriorating situation in the country, some government officials and the military 
became more discontented. As it became apparent that the assembly would 
support Egal’s choice, on October 21, 1969, the military conducted a coup and 
deposed the civilian government. The then-Army Commander, Major General 
Siad Barre, was installed as President, despite the fact that he too was from the 
Darod clan-family.   
In 1991, the Siad Bare government was ousted from power, 
principally by three factions: the Somali National Movement (SNM, Issaq clan-
family), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM, Ogaden clan of Darod clan-family), 
and the United Somali Congress (USC, Hawiye clan-family) of which Mohamed 
Farah Aideed is a member. The USC played a more integral role in ousting Barre 
than the other two factions, an excuse that the Hawiye clan-family may now be 
using to claim a leadership role in Somalia. After failing to agree on how to share 
power, the three factions split. Fighting broke out among the Hawiye clans 
(discussed in the next section) which led to Somalia being without a central 
government for a period of over 15 years.   
In October 2004, after two years of peace talks in Kenya, the 
Somalia TFG was formed and Abdulahi Yusuf, yet another member of the Darod 
clan-family, was elected President. This did not go over well with the Hawiye 
clan-family. They claimed the Darod clan-family had ruled Somalia long enough. 
It was, they believed, their turn. This may have been one of the reasons why the 
TFG has not been allowed to relocate to Mogadishu. Though Mogadishu is the 
capital city, the heavy presence of Hawiye warlords blocked the TFG. Abdi Kadir 
Dhakane (May 31, 2006), a minister of state in the office of the Prime Minister of 
Somalia, attempted to explain why the Hawiye clan-family should rule using a 
Somali metaphor: “You can’t steal a drum and begin playing the drum in the area 
where you stole it from and expect to invite the owners of the drum to dance to 
the beat with you.” 
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The interpretation of this metaphor is that a Darod clan member, 
President Abdulahi Yusuf, has “stolen the drum” (the presidency) from the 
Hawiye who are anxiously seeking the whereabouts of their “stolen” drum. 
Meanwhile, the President is expecting to play the drum in Mogadishu, a city 
mainly occupied by Hawiye clan members. To exacerbate the problem, Yusuf 
expects the Hawiye to dance to the “beat of his drum” with him. All the while, he 
well knows that the Hawiye will not be interested. This is one version of 
Somalia’s problems, viewed through the clan lens.  Essentially, the “stolen drum” 
metaphor symbolizes the struggle for power, a struggle which the Hawiye clan-
family promises will persist.  
b. Inter-Hawiye Clan Conflicts 
There are even bigger problems than the Hawiye-Darod rivalry. 
These relate to internal fighting within the Hawiye clan. In late 1990, the Hawiye’s 
USC was formed with two branches. The “external” branch was based in Italy 
and an “internal” branch based in Ethiopia. The “internal” branch, which was 
physically involved in fighting against Siad Barre’s regime, was led by General 
Aideed, while a prominent businessman, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, was a leader of 
the “external” USC branch. Aideed and Mahdi both belong to the Hawiye clan-
family, but were from different clans. Aideed was from the Habar Gadir clan while 
Mahdi was from Abgal clan (Prunier, July 1995, p. 8).  
In the confusion that followed the fall of Siad Barre, while Aideed 
was busy pursuing the remnants of Siad Barre’s forces, Ali Mahdi was 
proclaimed “President of Somalia” by his close associates of the “external” 
branch of the USC. This was done without consultation with other faction leaders 
(SPM, SNM, and Aideed of USC) who had fought the dictatorial regime. Mahdi’s 
appointment reflected increased social antagonism between the Habar Gadir and 
Abgal clans who then resorted to a bitter feud.  As a result, the USC split into two 
factions: the Somali National Aliance (SNA) led by Aideed and the Somali 
Salvation Alliance (SSA) under Mahdi.   
The inter-Hawiye clan fighting got worse when other Hawiye clans 
joined the conflict. Fighting broke out between Mahdi’s Abgal clan and the 
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Murosade clan of Mohamed Qanyare Afrah as Aideed’s Habar Gidir clan turned 
on the Hawadle clan. These Hawiye clans fought in skirmishes over the course of 
15 years. The prolonged period of fighting tore Mogadishu apart and brought war 
and devastation to the grain-producing region in southern Somalia.   
Based on these two examples (Darod-Hawiye rivalry and Inter-
Hawiye clan conflict), it emerges that the clan factor has been a major contributor 
to Somalia’s problems. It is a deep-rooted issue that has influenced the dynamics 
in Somali politics in the past and is likely to continue to affect the future of 
Somalia for quite a while.  
2. The Warlords 
Somalia has been engulfed by a surfeit of factional and clan conflict. But 
this is not strictly the result of Barre’s fall from power. Conflict in Somalia has 
been around since its independence. Not everybody agrees with this 
assessment. Dalka1 (June, 2006) is of the opinion that the problems in Somalia 
are caused by the warlords. The argument put forth officially is that warlordism in 
Somalia resembles what happens to a sick person, personified by the Somali 
society, when his disease is misdiagnosed. More specifically, Dalka believes that 
initial attempts to diagnose the problems in Somali society wrongly concluded 
that tribalism, spawned by Siad’s dictatorial regime, was the disease. On the 
contrary, asserts Dalka, the disease is not tribalism, but rather warlordism and 
colonization by proxy. Dalkas’s assessment points to tribalism and modern forms 
of international business.  
Warlordism became famous after the demise of Barre’s regime in 1991. 
Immediately following his ouster, anarchy spread and fighting intensified. Faction 
leaders centered their war against opposing clans in a struggle for dominance 
and survival.  Warlords, employing guerrilla tactics, quickly gained control of the 
cities, harbors, and airports. In turn, warlords expanded their personal fiefdoms, 
carved out their own sections of the country and completely gutted the 
infrastructure.  Compounding the problem, Somalia was in the midst of three 
                                            
1 Dalka is the official newspaper of Somalia’s government. Its articles are not attributed to 
specific authors. 
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years of drought which had dried up wells and rivers. When the United Nations 
peacekeeping force attempted to relieve the suffering, the warlords frustrated 
their attempts to distribute food and aid.  
Up until June 2006, the warlords and their private militias continued to 
undermine efforts to pacify the country through the establishment of an effective 
national government. Most warlords had neither an ideology nor a political 
agenda. Typically, they are motivated by the pursuit of money and war booty. 
The individual fiefdoms they carved out were used as bases for the exploitation 
of confiscated properties, as well as arms and drug trafficking. Clearly, 
warlordism is a successful business in Somalia - a source of income and 
employment. Warlords’ armed militias are responsible for the death of thousands 
of innocent people, and warlords carry the primary responsibility for the agony of 
the people.  
The first few warlords to rise to power after the fall of dictator Muhammad 
Siad Barre made huge fortunes for themselves. Consequently, their numbers 
increased in the last few years. They led successful “Mafia-style” businesses. 
Having money allowed them to acquire a large number of followers who viewed 
them as tribal employers not warlords. With money changing hands, tribal 
leadership shifted from traditional tribal leaders to warlords who bought tribal 
loyalty with foreign currency.   
Treating the disease of warlordism will be difficult. The treatment will be 
even more complicated if foreign governments interfere, especially those who 
desire warlords to continue to rule. Worth remembering is the situation in 
Somalia in the early 1990s, when Somalis themselves refused assistance from 
the international community. Little has changed since then; many Somalis remain 
skeptical of outside assistance. Yet, in terms of addressing societal ills, the 
international community has the resources and capacity to solve Somalia’s major 
problems.  
Clearly, the situation in Somalia is dynamic. Most recently, with the 
emergence of Islamic fundamentalists, the power of the warlords has been 
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significantly reduced. Before discussing the emergence of Islamic 
fundamentalism, l will discuss the warlords’ closest friends and partners: the 
warmongers. 
3. The Warmongers 
The majority of Somalia’s warlords were military officers in the government 
of Siad Barre.  Today, they are simple fighters who have little, if any, connection 
with the outside world.  As a result, they receive no external support.  Abdulahi 
Yusuf (2004) writes that during the civil war after the fall of Siad Barre, the 
warlords had to turn to their closest partners, the warmongers, in order to be 
connected to the outside world.  These were the financiers and business allies of 
the warlords.  The warmongers represent the nexus of power and influence.  
Arguably, they have become the most powerful entity in Somalia.  On behalf of 
the warlords, they controlled many profit-making activities.  They ran the 
plantations and managed and collected taxes from the seaports and airports.  
Other additional illicit business endeavors included drug-trafficking and the arms 
trade.  The warmongers served as the middlemen between the warlords and the 
outside world by establishing contacts with foreign companies.    
For almost a decade, the Mogadishu warmongers dealt with the lack of 
government and security by paying taxes to the warlords in return for protection.  
Beginning in about 1999, however, they decided to forego their security 
arrangement with the warlords.  In place of warlord protection, the warmongers 
turned to the militant arm of the sharia court system, which is run by the ICC.  
This shift in support might have been a precipitant to the recent clashes between 
the warlords and the Islamic clerics.  The warlords, unable to pay their militias, 
became weaker and weaker as more members of their militias defected to the 
ICC, which could afford to pay their salaries.  For the warlords, losing their 
primary source of funding drastically shifted the power calculus within Somalia.  
Meanwhile, from outside of Somalia, external support to the ICC further 




4. The TNG and TFG 
After refusing international support in the early 1990s, the world turned 
away from Somalia and the population was left to the mercy of the warlords. 
Numerous attempts, internal to Somalia, were made to strike a compromise 
among the warlords in order to form a national government. Sadly, they all failed. 
Unhappy warlords subverted each reconciliation conference. Meanwhile, 
neighboring Djibouti and Kenya, pained by the abominable predicament of the 
population, endeavored to take a stab at intra-Somali reconciliation. They invited 
delegates from various clans to take part in the Djibouti 2000 and Kenya 2002 – 
2004 conferences. In Djibouti, the TNG was formed with Abdiquassim Salad 
Hassan selected as its President. 
Initially, the TNG enjoyed solid support from powerful Mogadishu 
businessmen. In spite of the support, the TNG fell short of expectations, failing to 
gain any political results. In fact, the TNG never administered more than a portion 
of Mogadishu. Its desire to effectively govern came to naught because the TNG’s 
appointed leaders failed to quickly grasp the fleeting nature of popular support. 
They gave precedence instead to self-enrichment and personal gain. As a result, 
the international community was skeptical from the start and refused to give the 
TNG the necessary diplomatic and material support until it could develop the 
capacity to restore order and collect taxes. As the TNG dissolved, the public 
simply watched from the sidelines as the promise of the Djibouti conference 
dissipated (Dalka, July, 2006). 
With all these factors in play, the TNG was orphaned. Once again, Somali 
hopes were dashed.  Concerned about the floundering situation in Somalia, the 
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) states convened another 
reconciliation conference, this time in Kenya with the warlords dominating the 
debate.  
The outcome of the long reconciliation conference was the formation of 
the Somalia TFG. Not surprisingly, not everyone was satisfied with this outcome. 
Just the same, the public reluctantly accepted the TFG with the faint hope that 
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the new government would demonstrate good leadership. To date, a very 
important question remains: is the TFG going to improve on the weaknesses of 
its predecessor or make them worse?  
Unfortunately, as with the TNG, things have not gone well for the TFG. 
Nearly two years have elapsed since its inception and little progress has been 
made.  
One thing in the TFG’s favor is that the political environment has not 
enabled elected leaders to enrich themselves as was the case previously. 
Instead, they have been “fighting” amongst themselves, with some members 
aligning with the President and the Prime Minister. Still other groups have aligned 
with the speaker of the national assembly. The Mogadishu-based warlords, who 
were previously reluctant to participate in the Djibouti peace conference, actively 
took part in the Kenya conference. As a result, some of these civic-minded 
warlords were appointed to the cabinet. But there’s a rub. The problem with the 
warlords is that they continued commanding their militias and continued to 
oppose the government’s efforts to resettle in Mogadishu while at the same time 
occupying their cabinet positions. This is one reason why the donor community 
remains skeptical of the TFG and has withheld its diplomatic and material 
support. In donors’ view, the TFG has not demonstrated legitimacy, gained 
popular support or forged a credible administration.    
5. The Islamist Groups 
Until recently, there has never been popular support for fundamentalist 
Islamism or Islamic-style governance in Somalia, despite an overwhelmingly 
Muslim population.  Historically, the rule of law in Somalia has been based on 
clannism and not religion.  Various warlords, to include the infamous General 
Mohammed Farah Aideed, have staked their claims to various portions of the 
country, enforcing their rule through violence and intimidation.  Their authority 
was absolute.  But times have changed.   
In the early stages of the Somali civil war, various types of Islamist 
activism emerged. Famous amongst these are the Al Islah and Al Itihad 
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(sometimes jointly referred to as AIAI). Al Islah seeks to infuse Somali politics 
with a liberal reading of Islamic values through non-violent means, while Al Itihad 
advocates direct violence to achieve their goals. The strategic objective of Al 
Itihad was to build power by taking control of key economic installations across 
Somalia. They temporarily gained control of the seaports of Kismayo and Merka 
in 1991 and administered the commercial crossroad town of Luuq in the Gedo 
region. Wherever they gained control, they established Islamic law rather than 
customary law (Tavolato, 2004, p. 9). Along the way, Ethiopian and clan militia 
forces fought their progress northward.  
A second strategy of Al Itihad was social and economic consolidation. This 
strategy marked a complete departure from their more militant approach and is 
the result of frequent defeats at the hands of clan militias and Ethiopians. The 
following factors also contributed to a change in tactics. First, Al Itihad concluded 
that holding a town would make it too easy a target for more powerful external 
forces. Secondly, they realized that Somalis were not yet ready for Islamic rule. 
Instead, Al-Itihad opted to integrate into local communities and concentrate on 
expanding nation-wide influence as a grassroots movement. Their goal was to 
establish order, stability and moral rectitude. They established themselves in the 
local communities and in key sectors of society to include business, local courts, 
and schools, rather than attempting to assume more direct political control. As a 
result, today it is very difficult to distinguish between those who promote services 
to the people following an apolitical agenda (Al-Islah), and those who are 
involved in a deeper Islamization using political-military confrontation with global 
and political targets (Al-Itihad) (Le Sage, 2001).   
Until the beginning of 2006, the Islamic courts had been conducting their 
business without much interference from the government and the warlords. After 
nearly fifteen years of skirmishing between the Islamists and the warlords, the 
independent Islamist groups united and formed a consortium called the Islamic 
Courts Council (ICC).  The emergence of the ICC changed the conflict equation 
in Somalia.  Sensing the growing power of the ICC, the disparate warlords, in an 
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unprecedented move, decided to form an alliance (labeled the Alliance Against 
Terrorism and Restoration of Peace) to defeat their united foe.   
This arrangement among warlords was seen as an alliance of 
convenience based on the logic that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” 
Normally, such alliances are short-lived. Seeking to deal the ICC a crippling blow, 
the warlord alliance initiated its first attack against the ICC in February 2006.  
Contrary to their public claims, the warlords suffered a major setback and were 
forced to withdraw and regroup (Dalka, July, 2006).  The warlord alliance 
attacked again in June 2006.  This time they were soundly defeated.  The ICC 
drove the warlords out of Mogadishu and consolidated their control of the capital.   
The ICC’s revolutionary momentum has spread across southern Somalia 
where they have consolidated their power and displaced the remaining warlords 
(see Figure 3). With a firm grip on power in Mogadishu and in many southern 
villages and towns, the ICC has been able to take significant steps to completely 
transform the law and justice systems into ones which adhere to a strict 
interpretation of the Koran, similar to the interpretation used by the Taliban in 
Afghanistan (Le Sage, 2001). The ICC’s strict laws are not so popular with all 
Somalis. While predominantly a Muslim people, Somalis are reluctant to reject 
the idea of Islamic rule, however they are not happy with what they perceive as 
growing fundamentalism in their country. They view restrictions on their choices 
of social activities such as dancing, viewing television, and Hollywood movies as 
a denial of their rights. Likewise, Somalia’s neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia, are 
uncomfortable with a Somalia ruled by Islamic fundamentalists for fear that such 
a government could provide safe havens for terrorists. These same concerns are 
shared by the western countries.   
Challenged by the ICC, the weak TFG has only been able to stand by and 
watch. The diminution of the TFG’s authority and threat of the spread of 





Figure 3.   Area controlled by the ICC (sometimes referred to as Union of 
Islamic Courts (UIC)). Retrieved September 3, 2006 from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5307824.stm 
 
The ICC named cleric Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys as its leader and 
Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed chairman of its Executive Committee. Aweys was a 
colonel in the Somali army and fought in the 1977 Ogaden War against Ethiopia, 
during which he was cited for bravery. He is viewed as one of the more extreme 
leaders of the Union, which promotes sharia law. Sheikh Ahmed is a more 
moderate figure in the ICC and is not interested in imposing an Islamist social 
model on Somalia. His primary concern is bringing peace and order to Somalia. 
The divergent qualities of these two leaders cast doubts as to whether the ICC, 
which continues to secure and expand its power, is interested in a power-sharing 
agreement with the TFG. Confident in its eventual military victory over the TFG, 
yet internally divided about its strategic aims, the answer in unclear.  
Today, the TFG is restricted to the area around Baidoa while the ICC 
operates freely across the southern half of the country, to include Mogadishu. 
The warlords, though beaten by the ICC, cannot yet be written completely out of 
this struggle for power. They may well be regrouping and preparing to strike 
back. Affected by the events in Somalia, external actors have likewise been 
drawn into the recent conflict.  
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C. EXTERNAL ACTORS 
External actors have played a significant role in influencing the current 
conflict in Somalia. Such influences come from various countries and 
organizations that have permanent interests in Somalia for political, historical, 
strategic or security reasons. Some of these countries continue to try to influence 
Somali politics by organizing or supporting warring factions and creating 
misunderstanding amongst them, which has prompted the rivals to clash. Some 
of these actors and their motivations are listed below.  
1. Kenya 
Kenya’s national interest in Somalia revolves around issues that are key to 
its economic survival, territorial integrity, and security. Given the history of 
Kenya-Somalia relations, particularly over irredentist Somali policies regarding 
Greater Somalia, it is in the interests of Kenya to have a friendly government in 
Somalia. Such a government would promote peace and stability, which are 
essential for the overall stability of the region. Consequently, a strong foothold in 
Somalia’s post-conflict political situation is crucial for the role Kenya would play in 
the region. 
Kenya has borne the brunt of insecurity in Somalia. The large inflow of 
illegal arms and refugees from Somalia into Kenya has been a major source of 
Kenya’s worsening insecurity. This insecurity has compelled the Kenyan 
government to invest significant resources in protecting her citizens. As such, 
Kenya should aim to eliminate safe havens for terrorists and Islamic extremist 
groups which have emerged in Somalia. A peaceful and stable Somalia would be 
central to Kenya’s fight against organized and cross-border crimes emanating 
from Somalia. 
Kenya invested significant resources in the Somali National Reconciliation 
Conference that was held between 2002 and 2004. Following the successful 
formation of the TFG, IGAD states - and Kenya in particular - do not wish to see 
the TFG disintegrate like its predecessor, due to lack of necessary support and 
internal structural problems. Kenya, therefore, has the daunting task of ensuring 
that the new government succeeds. So does Ethiopia.  
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2. Ethiopia 
It is not possible to analyze Somali conflicts without considering her within 
a regional context. Ethiopia is situated in the middle of the Horn of Africa and is 
without a seaport. The religious and political history of Ethiopia is such that its 
Ethiopian Christian government, with about half of its population being Muslim, is 
permanently obsessed with the dangers of political Islam. Ethiopia has been 
waging a ten-year battle against numerous insurgent groups who enjoy 
significant external support. One such group is Al-Itihad Al-Islamia (AIAI) which 
has its base in Somalia. Beyond the danger of political Islamism, Somalia still 
lays claim to the Ogaden territories. Ethiopia fears the return of a strong 
fundamental Islamic state in Somalia, which could take up her irredentist claims 
to the Ogaden.  
With the nexus between irredentist sentiments in Somalia and the spread 
of fundamentalist Islam to its large Muslim population, Ethiopia is more anxious 
than any other regional power to prevent a hostile takeover of the Somalia 
government. Ethiopia believes that there is more to be gained from deterring an 
Islamic dominance in the region. To this end, Ethiopia constantly interferes in 
Somali domestic affairs by supporting either one faction or another. Regarding 
the current crisis, Ethiopia supports the Somali TFG and it is believed that 
Ethiopia has provided troops to protect the weak TFG from the ICC attacks 
(Bloomfield, 2006). What is not clear now is whether Addis Ababa is pursuing a 
limited strategy of buying time for the TFG or whether she is defeating the ICC. 
Eritrea, Ethiopia’s northern neighbor, has different objectives vis-à-vis Somalia. 
3. Eritrea 
Ethiopia and Eritrea fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000, following 
territorial disputes. Despite the appearance of calm, tension still exists between 
these two nations. Both of these countries are competing throughout the region 
and have backed rebel groups to destabilize one another. Somalia has allowed 
them to open up new fronts in their “Cold War.” 
Ethiopia and the TFG have been trading allegations that Eritrea is arming 
and helping the ICC militants. They believe Eritrea is fighting a proxy war with 
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Ethiopia in Somalia by supplying the ICC with weapons to fight the TFG and 
Ethiopia. The conflict became more complicated when a large cargo plane 
believed to have come from Eritrea landed at Mogadishu's airport in July 2006. 
The TFG alleged that the aircraft was carrying Eritrean military supplies for the 
ICC, including landmines, bombs, grenades, bazookas, anti-tank, and anti-
aircraft missiles. The ICC, however, denied the charges saying that the cargo 
was made up of "small sewing machines," medicine and medical supplies 
(Weinstein, August 02, 2006). If these allegations of supplying weapons are true, 
then it is clear that the ICC has Eritrea as a willing ally. Complicating matters 
further is the involvement of Egypt. 
4. Egypt 
Of all the Arab nations, Egypt has enjoyed the greatest influence in 
policymaking in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia.  Key to its 
policymaking concerns has been the use of the Nile waters, of which the Blue 
Nile contributes 86% of the total volume and originates in Ethiopia.  Egyptian 
leaders believe that their country’s virtual monopoly over the benefits of the Nile 
over the past half-century was largely due to the level of underdevelopment in 
the upper basin countries.  One reason for this level of underdevelopment was 
the internal strife in Ethiopia, as opposition groups sought to unseat Mengistu 
Haile Marium’s regime.  The emergence in 1991 of a stronger Ethiopia has 
pushed Ethiopia to greater use of its critical Blue Nile resource.  To the 
Egyptians, however, this attention threatens their unfettered access to Nile 
waters and their interest in the region (Tadesse, 2002, p. 170).  
Egypt believes that peace in Somalia will have its own positive trickle-
down effect on Ethiopia. As such, Egypt fears that any peaceful relationship 
between Ethiopia and the TFG will negatively affect its regional interests.  
Moreover, in the regional rivalry for influence, Egypt believes that Somalia is an 
integral part of the Arab world and should be inclined more to the broader Arab 
world than the larger African neighborhood.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that Egypt will be careful not to let Ethiopia have an unchecked influence 
in Somalia.  Simply put, Egypt desires the greatest share of influence in 
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Somalia’s political evolution. This is precisely why Egypt has allied itself with anti-
Ethiopian Somali forces (Tadesse, 2002, p. 174).  Here is where the ICC comes 
in.  By disguising a concern for security of and access to the Nile’s waters, it is 
almost certain that Egypt is supporting the ICC as a proxy in its competition with 
Ethiopia.  
5. The Western Powers 
The Western powers, led by the United States, have also been involved in 
Somalia. The United States, which secretly backed the defeated warlords in an 
effort to capture al-Qaeda operatives whom it believes are being sheltered by the 
Islamists, drew back and now appears to have decided to work with international 
and regional organizations (Weinstein, June 19, 2006). By expressing her 
support for the TFG, yet urging it to engage in dialogue with the ICC, the U.S. 
has lost influence and credibility in Somalia, largely due to its support for the 
warlords, whom the ICC defeated in June 2006. Interested European powers, 
especially Great Britain and Italy (the former colonial rulers of Somalia), as well 
as the United Nations, have also decided to work with international and regional 
organizations seeking to bolster the TFG. 
The main concern of the U.S. in Somalia is that the Islamic militia might 
impose strict religious courts in Mogadishu and surrounding areas, thus forming 
a Taliban-style hard-line regime. The United States has accused the ICC of 
harboring al-Qaeda members, whose leader, Osama bin Laden, denounced the 
TFG and called for support of the ICC in a July 2, 2006 audio tape recording 
(Weinstein, July 07, 2006). One of the ICC leaders, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, 
has been linked with the deadly bombings at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in 1998. He has been on the U.S.’s list of people "linked to terrorism" 
since shortly after the attacks on 9/11 (Winter, 2006).  
6. Regional and International Organizations 
The African Union (AU) and IGAD have pledged to support the TFG. They 
have promised to provide peacekeeping troops if an exemption can be made to 
the arms embargo imposed on Somalia by the UN Security Council in 1992. 
However, their support has been weak. The effectiveness of the AU and IGAD is 
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dependent upon diplomatic and financial backing from the Western powers who, 
despite offering support, are reluctant to empower the TFG.  
Due to feeble support from the AU, IGAD and Western powers, the Arab 
League (AL) has decided to step in and fill the void. In late June 2006, the AL 
initiated a peace process in Khartoum in an effort to ease tension between the 
TFG and the ICC. The AU, IGAD and the Western powers quickly and 
enthusiastically endorsed the peace initiative, only to see it disappear as both the 
TFG and the ICC refused to resolve the differences between them. At the time of 
this writing, the AL remains optimistic that the TFG and ICC will agree to open 
dialogue. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Until recently, the ICC had not been a key player in Somali developments. 
Yet, today they are laying the foundation for a more significant political struggle. 
Their strategy is to use economic leverage, Islamic populism and clandestine 
patronage networks in order to manipulate leadership and communal tension 
within the TFG. The West’s unwillingness to provide support and advice is 
allowing the formation of crippling divisions within the TFG.    
The future course of Somali politics will depend on the intentions of both 
internal and external actors, which presently remain unclear. For the time being, 
it is reasonable to argue that the ICC is the aggressor in the Somalia conflict; 
Addis Ababa and Nairobi believe this to be so. Both want to prevent the 
emergence of a fundamentalist Islamic state on their borders, one which might 
pursue irredentist claims. Asmara, on the other hand, is gaining leverage in 
Somalia by allying itself with the ICC. The regional organizations, like the AU and 
IGAD, are proving to be powerless to stop the conflict, mainly because of the lack 
of Western and UN support. But the West’s reluctance doesn’t end there. The 
West is also responsible for failing to bolster its rhetoric with credible incentives 
to the TFG and sanctions to curtail the ICC.  
Lastly, Somali cultural influence must not be underestimated. The usual 
traditional clan rivalries are likely to hamstring the ICC and force it to split along 
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clan lines. Equally, Somalia's generally moderate Muslim population may resist 
the imposition of Sharia law, thereby expanding the rift between the hard-liners 
and moderates in the ICC. 
Given the shortage of security forces to protect the TFG, the obvious 
question emerges: who will provide assistance? This is the question I intend to 
answer in the next chapter. In doing so, I will discuss the plans by IGAD to 
deploy peacekeepers in Somalia to assist resettling the TFG.  
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IV. IGAD’S ATTEMPTS TO INTERVENE IN SOMALIA’S 
CONFLICT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and the collapse of 
governmental authority in some states are the principle threats to international 
peace and stability. These threats are common in Africa. To deal with them 
requires rapid response from groups of well-trained, well-equipped military, police 
and civilian experts. The most violent and devastating conflicts in Africa have 
been intrastate in nature with considerable peacekeeping consequences for 
regional and international players.  
Somalia serves as an example of a country that is a threat to international 
peace and security. It has been in conflict and without a functioning government 
for over 15 years. The situation in Somalia has become a great concern for the 
AU, whose member states have indicated their willingness to take risks for 
restoring peace, stability, and good governance. The AU now has the 
responsibility of ensuring that the Somali TFG is reinstalled and functional. This 
is achievable only by defeating the armed militias in the country. For this reason, 
the AU, through its eastern regional body, IGAD, has planned to deploy 
peacekeepers in Somalia.  
In this chapter, I will provide a synopsis of the attempts by African nations 
to solve armed conflicts on the continent, by first looking at the broader initiatives 
by the AU, then narrowing focus to efforts by East African countries to try to solve 
the conflict in Somalia. I will finally highlight the major challenges that the East 
African region is facing in dealing with peace and security matters. 
B. AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE (ASF) 
Time is one of the most crucial factors in preventing an emerging crisis 
from erupting into a major war. Under the current UN peacekeeping structure, it 
takes an average of between three and six months from the time the UN Security 
Council decides to establish a peacekeeping mission until the UN is able to 
deploy peacekeepers and support equipment. Crises in Rwanda, Bosnia and, 
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more recently, the Congo and Liberia highlight the need for a readily deployable 
force. It is for this reason that the African Union is developing standby forces, 
similar to NATO, to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflicts and crises 
in Africa. The plan involves establishment of regionally-based multinational 
standby brigades, ready to intercede in situations of armed conflict or genocide. 
Each participating country is required to pledge soldiers and logistical support to 
the UN, AU or regional peace support operations (Cilliers and Malan, 2005, p. 
15). Currently, Africa plans to establish five regional standby brigades as shown 
in Table 1.  
 
Region Regional Economic Community Standby Brigade 
North AMU (Arab Maghreb Union) AMU Standby Brigade 
East IGAD EASBRIG (East African 
Standby Brigade) 
West ECOWAS ESF (ECOWAS Standby 
Force) 
South SADC SADCBRIG (SADC Brigade) 
Central ECCAS (Economic Community of 
Central African States) 
ECCAS Standby Brigade 
Table 1.   Africa’s Regional Standby Brigades 
 
Principally, the Standby Brigades will be responsible for preventing 
emerging crises in member states of their respective regions. Of the five regional 
economic communities (RECs), ECOWAS is the oldest (formed in 1975) and 
most active. It is the sole economic community in the western part of Africa and 
has a membership of 15 countries (Nivet, 2006, p. 13). Its armed component, the 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), now ESF, is operational and has 
participated in peace intervention missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-
Bissau, and Cote D’Ivoire. However, ECOMOG experienced financial and 
logistical constraints when it was initially deployed. One important thing about 
West Africa is that the 15 countries which form ECOWAS are also members of 
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ESF. This arrangement makes it easier for ECOWAS member states to respond 
swiftly to situations within their region. The other four regional Standby Brigades 
are in the formative stages. The AU’s plan is to have all the Standby Brigades 
operational by the year 2010 (Cilliers and Malan, 2005, p. 3). 
Unlike in West Africa, where there is only one dominant regional economic 
body, East Africa has a plethora of overlapping regional organizations. These 
organizations include the Common Market for East and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), and IGAD. Although the AU 
regards East Africa as a region composed of 13 countries, the region does not 
have an overarching body. Further, East Africa lacks an integrated conflict 
prevention, management and mitigation framework similar to that found in West 
Africa. This is a weakness for the East African region. The 13 countries that form 
East Africa, according to AU’s definition, include seven countries of IGAD (see 
Figure 4) and six other countries: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, and Tanzania (Policy Framework, 2005, p. 1). At the time of its 
establishment, EASBRIG was composed of these 13 countries. The composition 
has since changed. Recently, Tanzania and Mauritius detached themselves from 
EASBRIG and are now affiliated with SADC for their standby force commitment.   
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Figure 4.   IGAD countries. Retrieved August 11, 2006 from http://www.africa-
union.org/Recs/IGAD_Profile.pdf#search='IGAD' 
 
In the meantime, the AU mandated that IGAD should coordinate all 
EASBRIG activities (Policy Framework, 2005, p. 4). EASBRIG’s planning 
element is operational and located in Nairobi. Its Brigade and Logistics 
headquarters are located in Addis Ababa. EASBRIG, however, has many 
structural deficiencies which need to be rectified. These deficiencies make 
EASBRIG far from being ready for deployment.  
Even so, all is not negative for EASBRIG. At an April 2006 meeting in 
Nairobi, EASBRIG’s Ministers of Defense discussed plans to establish an 
independent coordinating mechanism to replace IGAD. This new body is 
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expected to enhance cooperation and harmony in the region. It will include 
countries of East Africa who are not members of IGAD (Communiqué, April 26, 
2006). This is a positive move by EASBRIG. If the new coordinating body is 
formed, then EASBRIG will have a regional body similar to ECOWAS. 
As Somalia’s peace and reconciliation meeting in Nairobi came to an end 
in October 2004, it became necessary for peacekeepers to be deployed to 
Somalia to assist in resettling the newly formed TFG. Ideally, it could have been 
EASBRIG’s task to provide the peacekeepers, but, since EASBRIG was not yet 
fully established, this did not happen. IGAD quickly thought of an alternative plan. 
In a meeting held in Uganda on March 14, 2005, IGAD’s Ministers of Defense 
approved an ad hoc plan to deploy peacekeepers formed from IGAD countries to 
assist in the restoration of Somalia’s TFG.  Sudan and Uganda were identified as 
the countries which would deploy troops under the body tagged IGAD Peace 
Mission in Somalia (IGASOM). The other IGAD countries were to assist in 
provision of logistics, equipment, emergency assistance, and training of the 
Somalia Army and Police (AU, May 12, 2005). IGASOM was expected to be 
deployed in May 2005 but, unfortunately, this deployment did not take place 
either. Challenges which I discuss in the next paragraph may have contributed to 
the failure of the deployment. 
C. IGAD’S CHALLENGES 
IGAD is currently facing problems similar to those which ECOWAS faced 
during its initial stages of formation. To begin with, ECOWAS was created to 
address economic, social and developmental challenges in West Africa. But due 
to an increase in conflicts in the region, ECOWAS gradually emerged as a 
regional security actor. In dealing with the new security challenges, ECOWAS 
faced financial and capability shortfalls, weak institutional preparation and lack of 
a protocol regarding mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution. At the 
present time, and with the increasing demand for conflict resolution in East 
Africa, IGAD is struggling to deal with challenges that may affect its future 
operations. Below is an elaboration of some of these challenges.  
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1. Organizational Structure 
Formed in 1986, IGAD had a very narrow mandate revolving around the 
issue of drought and desertification. Gradually, it became more involved in 
regional security and political dialogue.  
The secretariat of IGAD is located in Djibouti and is established with three 
divisions: Economic Co-operation; Agriculture and Environment; and Political and 
Humanitarian Affairs. It is headed by an executive secretary. IGAD, therefore, 
lacks a peace and security division. Yet, the region is prone to conflicts. A Peace 
and Security Division is needed that would have conflict solving mechanisms 
which may include peacekeeping and peace enforcement capabilities.  
Though IGAD member states are willing and committed to provide troops 
and/or equipment for IGASOM, this mission could be hampered by lack of an 
organizational structure to support the deployment. For this reason, IGAD should 
review its mandate and expand its secretariat to create a Peace and Security 
Division to be responsible for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 
(CPMR). Once this is done, legal adjustments to the IGAD mandate can be 
made. 
2. Legal Requirements 
In order for IGAD to deploy troops for any military operations, it is 
necessary that the agreement establishing IGAD be amended to include the 
undertaking of peace support and peace enforcement operations. This will 
require that Article 6A of the agreement establishing IGAD and any other article 
restricting IGAD to dialogue only, as opposed to intervening in solving conflicts, 
should be amended to provide for peace support operations, including peace 
enforcement. Also, Article 7 of the IGAD Charter, which itemizes the Aims and 
Objectives of IGAD authority to include promoting peace and stability through 
dialogue, should be amended to include the undertaking of peacekeeping 
operations and peace enforcement action (Agreement establishing IGAD, 1996). 
Amendments of these two articles will give IGAD troops the “teeth” to be able to 
use force to restore security should the situation dictate. 
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3. Financial and Logistical Problems 
Funding is important for the success of any mission. IGAD is facing 
financial problems similar to those that ECOWAS faced on the first deployment of 
ECOMOG in Liberia. ECOMOG lacked reliable financial and logistical support 
since it relied on voluntary contributions from ECOMOG member states. This 
was a miscalculation because most of ECOMOG’s contributing countries had 
limited resources and therefore they were often unable to respond, even to the 
urgent needs of their own forces at home. IGAD also depends on her member 
states to make financial contributions in order to support its activities. Yet, IGAD 
countries, whose economic mainstay is agriculture, have large areas that are arid 
and semi-arid lowlands. Being poor productive areas, the region’s economic 
power is therefore weak. As such, it is expected that the financial contributions by 
IGAD member countries may not be enough to support military missions which 
are usually expensive. Without external financial support, IGAD will have 
difficulties in supporting IGASOM.  
4. UN Arms Embargo 
An arms embargo was imposed on Somalia on January 23, 1992, 
following the rapid deterioration of the situation and heavy loss of human life after 
the overthrow of Siad Barre. UN Security Council Resolution 733 restricted 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia. Even though there 
have been many violations of the embargo, it now poses an obstacle for the 
deployment of troops in Somalia. It also makes it difficult to train Somali national 
army and other law enforcement agencies. Without a trained national army, and 
police force, it will be difficult for the TFG to be able to defeat the insurgents in 
the country while at the same time protecting the local population. It is therefore 
necessary that the UN lifts the arms embargo so as to allow IGAD to deploy 
troops in Somalia. IGAD and the AU have, on several occasions, appealed to the 
UN to lift the arms embargo, but the UN has been reluctant to act. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Do all these challenges mean that East Africans cannot assist one of their 
own? Structural and legal problems are solvable. Financial constraints can be 
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alleviated if the international community is willing to assist in solving the current 
crisis. The lifting of the arms embargo falls directly on the UN.  
Militarily, East African countries have had some exposure to 
peacekeeping operations, given their participation in missions authorized by the 
UN across the world. Given that Somalia is a problem in their own backyard, one 
would think IGAD countries would be willing to assist. In any case, they are 
familiar with Somalia’s terrain and weather. Additionally, East African troops have 
another advantage. They have benefited a lot from the American sponsored 
African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program. This program trained troops 
from East African countries to manage crises and solve conflicts within the 
African environment. It is now time for them to put into practice what they learned 
from the ACRI and follow-on training.   
With all this said, three questions remain. The ICC declared war on any 
peacekeeping troops to be deployed in Somalia. Therefore, the first question is 
whether IGASOM will be a peacekeeping or a peace-enforcement mission? 
Secondly, since the ICC has adopted an insurgent pattern of resistance, in the 
event IGASOM is deployed to Somalia, will it be ready for counterinsurgency 
operations? And if so, what strategies will IGASOM forces use in fighting the 
insurgents? These are the questions I will attempt to answer in the next chapter. 
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V. IGAD AND TFG’S STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS IN 
SOMALIA   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before considering a solution to the Somali problem, one needs to 
understand the necessity of restoring a viable government in Somalia. Today, 
fundamentalist Islamism is a growing problem which has come to dominate the 
ICC-held portions of Somalia. Fundamentalist Islamism has the potential to breed 
not only domestic terrorism, but also provide a useful cover for international 
terrorist activities. None of the IGAD countries would like to have a neighbor with 
terrorists. Therefore, the sooner an effective government in Somalia is able to 
undermine, crush, or co-opt the ICC, the sooner a potential safe haven for 
terrorists will be denied. Denying terrorists a sanctuary is one of the principal 
reasons why it is necessary to resolve the conflict in Somalia.  
Prior to spring 2006, the Mogadishu warlords represented the main 
opposition to the TFG. Due to abrupt changes during the summer, this dynamic 
has shifted; the ICC now poses the main threat to the nascent government. 
What’s more, a series of rapid victories over the beleaguered warlords has 
brought much of southern Somalia into the ICC’s column. What can be done? 
One way the Somali crisis can be resolved is through dialogue. If the TFG 
and the ICC can engage in genuine dialogue and agree to form a coalition 
government, then a solution to the prolonged Somali anarchy will have been 
solved. If, however, dialogue fails, as it has so often in the past, then a new 
round of fighting will commence: this time between the TFG and the ICC.   
In the previous chapters, I identified the ICC as the aggressive force in the 
Somalia crisis. I suggested that they have adapted an insurgent form of warfare 
against the TFG. Ultimately, their aim is to destroy the TFG and transform 
Somalia into an Islamic state. In this chapter, I will discuss the strategies which 




B. COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL 
There are scores of models that have been designed based on theories 
dealing with insurgency and counterinsurgency. But not all of these theories can 
be applied to all insurgencies. One model that fits the current insurgency problem 
in Somalia is the Mystic Diamond (see Figure 5). This is an insightful model 
developed by Dr. Gordon McCormick (2005), chairman of the Defense Analysis 
Department of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The Mystic Diamond 
model offers a coherent and holistic counterinsurgent plan for state security 
forces that have to face off against a shadowy insurgency. By understanding and 
using this model effectively, the Somalia TFG can put itself in a position to 
reverse the situation on the ground and engender the support of the Somali 













Figure 5.   The Mystic Diamond Model 
 
Defeating the insurgents transcends victory on the battlefield. Complete 
victory implies working with the population towards building a conducive 
environment wherein the population will trust the government to provide for its 
needs: security, education, energy, infrastructure, etc. It is through the 
population, the insurgency’s primary source of support, that the government must 











uncouple the insurgency from the population, it must then sequentially apply the 
strategies as depicted in the Mystic Diamond.  
On an abstract level, and from the government’s point of view, there are 
five strategies which must be accomplished. The first strategy is “establishing 
control of the population.” Here, the government has to build its credibility with 
the population. Through credibility comes control. After building legitimacy and 
control, the government will then be able to acquire crucial intelligence about the 
insurgency through a credible incentive (and disincentive) program.  
The second strategy is “disrupting the relationship between the insurgents 
and the population.” The purpose of this strategy is to undermine the insurgents’ 
legitimacy and their level of control over the population. Only after successfully 
carrying out Strategies One and Two can a government force advance to 
Strategy Three.  
The third strategy is the government’s “direct targeting of the insurgent 
force.” This strategy can only be employed after the insurgents have been 
identified, which comes following intelligence information gained during the 
execution of Strategies One and Two.  
The fourth strategy is “targeting the infrastructure of the insurgents 
through the assistance of the international community.” This strategy is 
particularly important in the event the insurgency enjoys external support. If so, 
the government must build its legitimacy in the eyes of relevant international 
actors and pressure them to impose sanctions on the supporters of the 
insurgency.  
Lastly, the fifth strategy is to “build an external legitimacy with the 
international community.” Building external legitimacy with the international 
community is important because it will bring increased external support in the 
form of money, equipment and other resources. It is important to note that while 
the ideal sequence of defeating insurgents would be to follow strategies in 
numerical order, Strategies Four and Five may be conducted concurrently with 
the other three strategies. Also, the situation may dictate whether or not there 
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should be an overlap of these strategies.  To reemphasize, it is necessary to 
achieve Strategies One and Two before advancing to Strategy Three. 
If applied in the Somali case, the Mystic Diamond model would resemble 
Figure 6, where the counter-state is the ICC. Remembering back to Chapter III, 
the ICC is an illegal armed Islamic movement controlled by Islamic clerics. They 
have grafted themselves onto the aims and aspirations of the Somali population 
in Mogadishu and have spread across the entire south. The ICC has so 
influenced much of the Somali population that it managed to soundly defeat a 
coalition of warlords in June 2006. This success must be attributed to the trust 
that the ICC has forged with the population.  
On the left side of the model (Figure 6) is the state. The state is the TFG 
which is currently being supported by IGAD. The population is the Somali people 
while the international community includes those who support both the TFG (e.g. 






























C. THE WINNING STRATEGIES 
Weak and institutionally divided, the TFG has been idly watching from its 
sanctuary in Baidoa. The TFG lacks a military or security force. Its federal 
institutions are virtually non-existent, its parliament split on several issues. 
Disappointingly, some ministers resigned from the cabinet and allegedly joined 
the ICC. In Chapter IV, I stated that IGAD is planning to send peacekeepers, 
IGASOM, to assist the TFG. Upon deployment, it will be necessary for IGASOM 
to have developed strategies capable of defeating the ICC. The following text 
outlines a few possible actions, based on the Mystic Diamond model which, if 
executed properly, could enable the TFG via IGASOM to defeat the ICC. 
1. Strategy 1 - Establishing Control of the Somali Population 
Andrew Krepinevich, in his book, The Army and Vietnam (1986), writes 
“winning the hearts and minds of the people is as desirable for the government 
as it is for the insurgent” (p. 12). This is particularly important because if the 
insurgents control the population, then they will eventually win the war and 
probably control of the country. Insurgents will win because active popular 
support will provide them with stocks of fresh recruits, food, medicine, and 
shelter. Moreover, the support of the people assists the government security 
forces with accurate and timely intelligence. Just as Hezbollah has engrafted 
itself to the aims and aspirations of the Lebanese Shiite community in order to 
shield itself from Israel, so too has the ICC brokered a similar arrangement in 
Somalia. Simply stated, the ICC is in control of the population in southern and 
central Somalia, to include Mogadishu. The ICC achieved this trust relationship 
by providing security, reinstalling law and order and providing social services. It is 
the willingness of the women, children and old men to support the ICC and its 
political program, at the risk of their lives, that gives the organization power far 
beyond its military means.  
In order for the TFG to be able to reverse this trend and develop popular 
support from among the population, it must be able to provide pure preferences 
(public goods/rights to include roads, water, education, etc.) and incentives to 
sway popular support in their direction. With the support of IGAD, the TFG will 
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need to undertake certain activities all in support of the actions recommended in 
Strategy One of the Mystic Diamond model. Below are some such necessary 
activities.  
a. Incentives 
The incentives that the TFG and IGAD offer to the Somalis should 
be carefully selected according to the needs of the population. These incentives 
can be identified by talking to local leaders and the population. IGAD forces 
should plan, prioritize and carry out construction projects, such as building 
schools, hospitals, markets, dams, boreholes, cattle dips and veterinary clinics. 
They should plan to construct or repair administrative buildings to include offices, 
court houses, police stations and prisons. Subject to the financial limitations of 
IGAD, it should conduct road and airfield repair/construction or, if necessary, 
contract some of these projects out to private companies. This will be no easy 
task for IGAD and the TFG; and, it will require substantial funding. However, with 
the concerted efforts of the international community, the seemingly grandiose 
task can become a reality.  
b. Law Enforcement 
Countries bordering Somalia, along with the western powers, have 
raised concerns about transnational terrorist groups and criminals exploiting 
Somalia’s lack of a security apparatus. The collapse of Somalia, in fact, created 
conditions for lawlessness, just as armed conflict creates an environment 
conducive to opportunistic criminal enterprises (looting, rape, and hijacking for 
ransom). Nevertheless, Somalia has repeatedly shown, even in the context of 
state collapse and armed conflict, that informal systems of governance can 
ensure the rule of law and, in some instances, surprisingly high levels of 
community protection. Indeed, one of the most intriguing paradoxes of 
contemporary Somalia is how dramatically and quickly rule of law and security 
can change.  Within a year, a town or neighborhood, one which had been 
habitually bandit-ridden, can reverse its fortunes and become a model of relative 
tranquility. Likewise, towns lauded for their peace and security can fall quickly 
into lawless criminality (Tavolato, 2004, p. 9). These opposite ends of the 
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security pole demonstrate the need to establish organized and effective law 
enforcement agencies and how, through these agencies, criminal activities, 
anarchy and terrorism can be controlled and curtailed.  
A population’s most important requirement is security. In Somalia, 
the TFG must satisfy this need or run the risk of losing popular support. The 
population will rightly fear ICC retaliation if people support a government that 
won’t be able to protect its citizenry in the future. After all, outside peacekeepers, 
like IGASOM, are temporary. For this reason, the TFG should request IGAD’s 
assistance in training the Somali army, police and prison guards. Once trained, 
Somalis would be responsible for the security of their respective regions. While 
peace is being restored, IGASOM should assess the best time to begin the 
process of disarming the ICC. However, due to the Somali addiction to guns, the 
disarmament process is expected to be difficult in practice.  
c. Political Approach 
One of the biggest obstacles in African politics is tribalism. Like 
many other African nations, Somalia has had this problem in terms of clan 
politics since independence. This time, however, the leaders of the TFG would 
do well to avoid sticking to ethnic lines in terms of their elected leaders. There is 
no doubt that power and influence can be acquired and exercised for insidious 
purposes; this has been the norm in Somalia for several years. This norm has 
steeped Somalia in a morass of chaos and malfunction.  
More than ever, Somalia needs statesmen. It needs charismatic 
leaders who will lead not through the power of the gun, but through fair play and 
mature politics. The TFG leaders must put their country first before thinking about 
their clans. Putting the country first will strengthen Somalia. This may not be 
achieved overnight, but it is an endeavor to strive for. And local politics is key.  
Learning the lessons of Hezbollah, the TFG politicians must be 
willing and able to work in the underbelly of local politics. Mobilizing the 
population to pick up trash, caring for the old, women and children, and creating 
jobs though investments in the economy will raise the image of the TFG.   
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IGAD should advise and encourage the TFG politicians to rally a 
national sense of civic duty which would bolster the TFG. It is obvious that the 
absence of public participation in political matters is seriously “injuring” the 
government’s efforts in fighting the insurgents. This absence might fracture a 
tenuous peace which was achieved in Nairobi after intensive diplomacy among 
the Somali clan representatives.  
d. Restoring the Judicial System 
During the latter 1990s, informal entities in Somalia, loosely led by 
clan elders and others, started to become more structured and institutionalized. 
Though a variety of entities emerged, three were predominant: a coalition of clan 
leaders, businessmen, and the Muslim clergy who oversee and administer the 
sharia courts. Ken Menkhaus (2003) argues that several features of these sharia 
courts make them appealing to the population. This popularity challenges the 
governing institutions of the TFG. Amongst other accomplishments, the sharia 
courts have proven able to restore law and order in the south which has 
engendered popular support.  
One may wonder why Somalis would prefer the harsh sharia courts 
over others. The most probable reason is that the locals want to fill the security 
gap created after a decade and a half of anarchy. The population is tired of the 
unrelenting intimidation, kidnappings, theft and violence; the sharia courts offer a 
remedy to the chaos and fear. Put another way, in the absence of government 
leadership, the population has opted to accept the sharia courts. This, then, 
illustrates the ICC’s ability to operate successfully at the grassroots level.  
IGAD should therefore work with the TFG towards establishing a 
properly networked judicial system that would ensure the enforcement of 
constitutional law. This would be a positive move towards having the necessary 
judicial links down in the communities. IGAD should assist the TFG in re-
establishing the judicial system, since it is an important arm of the government 




e. Job Opportunities 
The long civil war in Somalia produced a “lost” generation of young 
Somalis who came of age in a time of a collapsed state. Lacking education, 
many Somali youth had one choice: employment in a factional, warlord-controlled 
militia. Beginning in 1999, Mogadishu businessmen, who had previously 
bankrolled the warlords in return for personal protection, began refusing to pay 
the warlords. Instead, many started funding their own militias (Tavolato, 2004, p. 
7). Most recently, the businessmen have sub-contracted their security needs to 
the sharia court system who also have private militias. In any case, the salaries 
that the militiamen used to get were low - a dollar or two per day per militiaman 
(Menkhaus, 2003).  
The decreased status and earning power of the gunmen prompted 
a gradual, yet spontaneous, demobilization of militiamen. The twisted effect of 
this development was increased problems of lawlessness, especially kidnapping 
for ransom since youth were no longer controlled by the militias but still had their 
weapons.  
In order to liberate Somalia’s young generation - who are not to 
blame for Somalia’s sad state of affairs - the government, with the assistance of 
IGAD and the broader international community, desperately needs to develop the 
economy, thereby creating responsible and attractive employment opportunities, 
attractive in terms of salaries more meaningful than those offered by the ICC and 
the warmongers.  If economic development were to work, we would expect to 
see a reduction in the ICC’s recruiting pool as the TFG gains a larger, supporting 
constituency. The end result: a stronger government, shrinking unemployment 
and a weaker ICC. 
2. Strategy 2 - Disrupting the Relationship Between the ICC and 
the Population  
Bringing the insurgency back down to tolerable levels is very doable. This 
second strategy is not about defeating the insurgents, but rather constricting their 
operating environment. Specifically, Strategy Two seeks to make it harder for the 
insurgents to operate freely on any level. It seeks to curtail an insurgent group’s 
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ability to conduct operations, procure and transfer false documents, ferry militia 
from place to place, and transfer funds. As Krepinevich (1986) asserts, “if denied 
the ability to move quickly and easily among the population, the insurgents will 
become, to paraphrase Mao, like fish out of water” (p. 11). In Somalia, however, 
the insurgents are located in towns, unlike the insurgents in Malaya and Kenya 
during the Mau Mau, whose operational bases were in the forests. As a result, 
the insurgent, as Mao once professed, “moves freely as if a fish in the sea.” 
Taking this fact to heart, IGAD and the TFG need to make it difficult for the ICC 
to conduct operational, logistical and financial activities. They need to deny the 
ICC the freedom of movement to conduct these activities. One way is to impose 
sanctions on both the ICC and its local supporters. Another way is to penetrate 
the ICC via informants in order to gain information. I elaborate on these two 
options below.  
a. Sanctions 
The beauty of seeding weakness into an organization is that one 
can degrade its effectiveness while still monitoring it, and not allowing a new and 
potentially more dangerous organization from erupting. As the saying goes, 
better the devil you know than the one you don’t. In other words, keep the 
organization alive since you know how it works. The same can’t be said for an 
unknown organization. In Somalia, the TFG must impose sanctions on the ICC 
and its supporting businessmen. The ICC can be restricted if its illicit assets are 
frozen and members and their families are levied with strict travel bans.  
b. Intelligence 
Attaining a clear picture inside the ICC will require watertight 
intelligence. In fact, the TFG’s ability to wage effective intelligence operations will 
determine this conflict’s outcome.  As Joel Garreau (2001) aptly points out, 
“Intelligence is crucial to analyze the network’s weak links so you can destroy it.”  
High-quality intelligence enables a clear picture of a networked enemy, a chance 
to see inside its otherwise shrouded world.  From there, the TFG will be able to 
proceed to Strategy Three.  
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There are a number of types of intelligence (e.g., signals, imagery, 
communications and human intelligence), but in Somalia not all apply or serve 
equal purposes.  On the socially networked, Third-World battlefield of Somalia, 
the value of human intelligence (HUMINT) supersedes the others.  So how does 
one acquire this type of intelligence?  Professor Dorothy Denning (2006) has an 
answer.  In her estimation, there are three ways to gather intelligence: through 
infiltration of the network, effective law enforcement or by using an informant.  
Exploiting the ICC through infiltration would be only marginally useful.  The ICC is 
based on trust, though not in the same fashion as with social connections via 
Somalia’s clans. Therefore, an infiltrator would have a very difficult time gaining 
access to the ICC’s senior leadership. Option two is off the table - there is no 
traditional law enforcement in Somalia.  This leaves option three.  But here’s the 
rub: option three relies on trust, not yet a strong suit of the TFG. 
If the government hopes to gain an insider’s look at the ICC, it must 
possess a handful of well-placed informants.  This will not be easy as the 
population has widely embraced and, in many communities in the south, joined 
the ICC.  Similarly, the public’s perception of the TFG presents another limitation.  
As a rule, the population does not trust the TFG.  Why not?  It does not know the 
TFG.  Nonetheless, there is hope.  Playing to the advantage of Somalia’s fragile 
government are the various sects within the ICC, some of which have conflicting 
goals.     
Being able to address the grievances of the disgruntled groups 
within the ICC will go a long way towards “turning” well-placed insiders.  The first 
order of business for the TFG will be to isolate these scorned groups and make 
contact with their key personnel.  The TFG will need to attend to their grievances 
in order to develop indispensable informants.  This might require offering 
rewards, such as a sum of cash or a position of authority or a government post, 
or simply allowing a disgruntled insider to see himself as an activist (Denning, 
2006).  Once acquired, helpful informants will soon provide the authorities with 
the requisite intelligence to accurately identify the ICC’s goals, uncover its plans, 
and detect and locate the senior leadership.   
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With informants inside the ICC, the TFG will be in a better position 
to manipulate fissures.  If distrust runs deep enough, the ICC could implode from 
within.  But, even if the TFG cannot force an implosion of the ICC, with concrete 
knowledge of its hierarchy and future plans, it can creatively apply deterrent 
options.   
3. Strategy 3 - Direct Targeting of the ICC 
Any successful counterinsurgency strategy must involve securing the 
government’s base areas, separating the insurgent forces from the population, 
and eliminating the insurgent’s infrastructure. In areas infested by insurgency, 
like Mogadishu, government troops must concentrate enough force to either 
destroy or expel the main body of insurgents in clear-and-hold operations while 
preparing the area for pacification. These two steps represent those which must 
be taken in order to assert control over the population and win its willing support 
(Krepinevich, 1986 p. 13).  
In Chapter II, I stated that the Somalis are a warlike people who possess a 
xenophobic character. The intended deployment of peacekeeping forces 
sponsored by IGAD has been received with resistance. The ICC is unalterably 
opposed to the deployment of foreign troops in Somalia and has vowed to resist 
any foreign troops deployed in the country (Weinstein, June 27, 2006). These 
developments, therefore, call for a specialized peacekeeping force with a robust 
mandate. Whatever the case, it is quite clear that the TFG’s survival depends 
upon the peacekeepers.  
In the early 1990s, the international community, led by the U.S., attempted 
to restore peace and public authority. As history makes clear, that effort ended in 
disarray. Certain factors led to this failure and IGAD would do well to learn from 
these lessons (Dalka, July 2006). First, as Dalka (2006) argues, “the operation’s 
mandate was unspecified.” This time, the mandate must be clear and precise, so 
as to avoid a backlash reminiscent of the early 1990s. Secondly, Dalka (2006) 
states that “... the militias in Mogadishu, which was the operational center of the 
intervention, were not disarmed and that gave the faction leaders enough 
opportunity to do mischief.” As mentioned earlier in this paper, Somalis have an 
55 
addiction to guns by virtue of the perceived “gun culture.” No doubt, most 
Somalis including the ICC will resist any attempts at disarmament. Yet, 
disarmament is the best way to reduce the violence in Somalia. So what can be 
done? IGAD must develop a workable disarmament plan so as to ensure that the 
disarmament is not counterproductive. Participatory disarming, where local 
vigilantes peacefully disarm the militia, might well be one solution (Mburu, 2002, 
p. 13). For instance, in 2002, following an increase of ownership of illegal 
weapons by locals, Uganda introduced armed militia groups in the villages called 
Local Defense Units (LDU) who were made to implement a voluntary gun 
surrender program mainly amongst the Karamojong tribe.  As an incentive, the 
surrendered guns were exchanged with items such as building materials, farm 
implements, schools, new wells, and capital investments (Kopel, 2002). This 
disarmament initiative can further be improved by issuing registered weapons 
and ammunition to selected villagers who will become home guards. Their 
responsibility will be to assist the security forces in providing security to the 
locals. The home guards should be made accountable for all actions taken with 
their weapons.    
4. Strategy 4 - Targeting Infrastructure of the ICC with the 
International Community 
If the insurgency is receiving external assistance, the TFG and IGAD must 
target and disrupt these lifelines by all means possible. By determining the key 
nodes in the insurgents’ network and shutting down the ICC’s front companies 
and charities, the TFG will have done much to curtail logistical support and stem 
the flow of funds to and among the Islamic militia groups. Sanctions on foreign 
corporations doing business with the ICC are a first logical step. This would 
ensure the isolation of those responsible for the current insurgency in Somalia. 
However, this can only be done if the TFG receives the assistance of the UN and 
the Western powers because the TFG is too weak politically and economically to 




5. Strategy 5 - Building External Legitimacy with the International 
Community 
The situation in Somalia presents a range of challenges, from improving 
socio-economic conditions to governance and human rights. Other challenges 
include the lack of security, terrorism and regional instability. In order to address 
these challenges, the international community must support the consolidation of 
representative and effective governance in Somalia. There are indications of 
increasing functional cohesion among the ministries in the TFG, which could 
intensify if given the required political, diplomatic and financial support. The TFG 
should therefore develop and maintain a good, working relationship with the 
international community in order to court much-needed support. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The situation in Somalia cannot be solved by military means alone. It 
requires a host of solutions, ranging from military, political, diplomatic and even 
economic incentives. Presently, the situation favors a combination of both military 
and political approaches. Somalia has 18 administrative regions, some of which 
are relatively calm (see Figure 7). Five regions to the north seceded and formed 
Somaliland, while the three regions in the northeast formed Puntland. Both 
Somaliland and Puntland are relatively calm. However, the remaining 10 regions, 
namely those in the south, are not. It would be wise to provide assistance to 
those regions where peace and stability have been secured through civilian-
based governance as well as to other relatively calm regions before dealing with 
the south and Mogadishu district. Even so, assisting Somaliland may not achieve 
much in convincing residents there to merge with Somalia. Unlike Puntland, 
which considers itself an autonomous state within Somalia, Somaliland declared 
independence in 1991. Over the years, it has managed to establish itself as a 
model of stability, good governance and economic discipline, but has failed to 
receive international recognition. Chances for Somaliland to reintegrate with the 
south are remote. Helping Puntland and other relatively stable provinces to 




local level for democratic structures and mechanisms would serve as a powerful 
incentive for others to follow. This approach could also be seen as one which 
could attract popular support.  
Ultimately, defeating the ICC requires the TFG and IGAD forces to 
accumulate their strength through first and foremost establishing control of the 
population. Only after gaining control should they directly target the ICC. As Lt. 
Col. Eric P. Wendt (September 2005) puts it, “Like the moving bubble on a level, 
the behavior of the bulk of the populace will shift to assist either the government 
or the insurgents, depending on the carrots and sticks used by each side.” 
Offering incentives to the population is key in this conflict. It increases the 
government’s chances of winning the hearts and minds of the population since, 
to the degree that the ICC is in control of the population then, by definition, the 
TFG stands to lose its legitimacy. 
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Figure 7.   Administrative Regions. Retrieved July 15 2006 from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Somalia_pol02.jpg 
 
Hoping that IGASOM will apply the Mystic Diamond model strategies in 
fighting the ICC, how will the ICC react? Since June 2006, the ICC has enjoyed 
an unbroken string of successes by establishing order in regions under its 
control. The ICC will therefore want to continue maintaining control of the 
population in these areas while frustrating government efforts in interacting with 
the population. The ICC fears that deployment of IGASOM would undermine its 
authority and popularize the TFG’s. As such, its reaction will likely be to mobilize 
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popular sentiments against the deployment of the peacekeepers while devoting 
its attention to recruiting and training its armed forces in anticipation of “war.” 
This therefore calls for IGASOM to be prepared to confront the ICC should the 
situation demand, even though an indirect approach to Somali conflict would be a 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Until recently, warlords wreaked havoc across Somalia.  In the quest for 
self-gain, their incessant fighting resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands.  
Together with their bank-rolling partners, the warmongers, the warlords were 
responsible for pervasive devastating social conditions.  Indeed, decrepit social 
conditions have stalled development efforts and destroyed most Somalis’ quality 
of life.  In the past year, however, things have changed in the south.  
With the defeat of the warlords in June 2006, the ICC emerged as a 
dominant player in Somalia.  Many positive changes have taken place in areas 
under the ICC rule.  Across southern Somalia, including Mogadishu, Somalis 
have a renewed sense of security and justice thanks to the ICC.  On the one 
hand, this has been encouraging for many a destitute Somali.  On the other 
hand, the ICC’s strict and often severe interpretation of Islamic law has brought 
to everybody’s mind images of 1990s Afghanistan under Taliban rule.  The ICC is 
opposed to social activities such as dancing, viewing television, and Hollywood 
movies. It has banned listening to western music, thereby raising public 
disaffection.  And there’s more.  The ICC has also prohibited the chewing of 
Khat2, which is an important staple of Somali life and is an enormously lucrative 
cash crop.  Increasingly, many Somalis have begun to fear a future under ICC 
rule.  While Somalis, predominantly a Muslim people, are reluctant to reject the 
idea of Islamic rule, they are not happy with what they perceive as growing 
fundamentalism in their country.  
Future acts of terrorism can be predicted using theories which explain past 
patterns of similar events.  As a phenomenon, warlordism bred not only mayhem 
and domestic terrorism, but international terrorist activities.  Many experts believe 
that the plotters of the August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and 
Tanzania were linked to an Al-Qaeda cell operating in Somalia.  Moreover, the 
                                            
2 A narcotic plant grown in Ethiopia, Kenya, and northern Somalia whose fresh green leaves 
are chewed for their stimulating effect, ranging from a pleasant mild insomnia to a mild 
intoxication. 
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fact that an Al-Qaeda cell was able to perpetrate a major attack on an Israeli 
resort near Mombasa, Kenya, in November 2002 illustrates the capacity of 
militants to freely operate within Somalia.  In this regard, the ICC is not much 
different from the warlords.  In fact, it is likely to be more closely aligned to 
fundamentalist Islamist groups than are the warlords.   
The ICC’s aggressive posture against the TFG has raised questions 
amongst regional organizations (IGAD and AU), the UN and the West about the 
ICC’s true intentions.  Which country would accept a fundamentalist Islamic state 
as its neighbor? Certainly not Kenya or Ethiopia.  Likewise, though thousands of 
miles from Somalia, the U.S. is opposed to a Somalia ruled by Islamic radical 
clerics. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the sooner the Somalis are rid 
of the fundamentalist Islamists, and ruled by a representative, secular 
government, the faster another potential safe haven for international terrorists will 
have been removed from the map. 
Unlike the populations of other countries in the Horn of Africa, Somalis 
should no longer be mere spectators.  Waiting for someone else to salvage their 
domain is a recipe for failure. Fifteen years of conflict should be long enough for 
the Somalis to have learned a lesson.  Why should they lag behind their 
neighboring countries when it comes to basic freedoms and security?  When will 
Somalia mature politically?   
Kenya transformed into a multiparty democracy in 1992; Ethiopia did the 
same in 1995.  In fact, Ethiopia went further, adopting a tiered system of 
government consisting of a federal government and ethnically based regional 
states.  Thus far, both Kenya and Ethiopia are doing well.  Alas, it is high time 
that Somalia should break free of clannist politics.  Civic organizations, whose 
purpose would be to support the elected government, are critical.   Somalis 
should insist on a government based upon democracy and accountability.  
Getting to this point will require Somalia to undergo a complete political evolution 
just like its neighbors.   
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Given the poverty and scarcity of resources in Somalia, the international 
community - for reasons of both self-interest and regional stability - should 
materially and diplomatically support the TFG.  Further, the international 
community must consider local and international terrorists equally dangerous and 
warn the ICC to exercise restraint and cease their revolutionary activities.  The 
international community must pressure the ICC to surrender their weapons and 
disband their militias.  Above all, the TFG is Somalia’s legitimate government, at 
least recognized by IGAD and the UN, but not by the donor community and many 
Somalis. Nonetheless, the ICC should not be allowed to act as a state within a 
state, as the world has witnessed in Lebanon with Hezbollah.  If the Somalis 
would desist from their xenophobic and mistrustful attitude toward foreigners, 
then the international community’s support could galvanize the majority of the 
Somali population and rekindle a nationalist vision.  This will be key to the 
creation of a new political order.  Similarly, as in any representative government, 
if the ICC desires political participation, they should be allowed to compete as a 
political party.  Without question, however, they must be made to disarm.   
In any conflict, resolving problems through mutual consultation and 
dialogue is always the best way forward.  Regrettably, this has not been the case 
in Somalia where efforts to reconcile differences between the TFG and the ICC 
have been unsuccessful. Although it is Somalia’s internationally acceptable 
government, the TFG is fragile and has been threatened by the ICC.  For this 
reason, IGAD came up with the initiative for deploying IGASOM in order to 
restore the TFG.  Enabling IGASOM to succeed will require that its troops be 
trained and organized for counterinsurgency operations.  It is important that 
IGASOM understand that an effective counterinsurgency strategy requires an 
appreciation of how and why insurgent movements succeed while developing a 
strategy to defeat them.  
As I have previously discussed, counterinsurgency operations place a 
premium on winning the hearts and minds of the population.  This truism conflicts 
with the military axiom of massive firepower liberally applied.  Therefore, 
IGASOM must be prepared for a long counterinsurgency campaign in Somalia, 
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where the emphasis must be on deploying light infantry formations, limiting 
firepower and avoiding “sweep and clear” or “search and destroy” operations.  
Success can be found by applying the Mystic Diamond model.   
As Sun Tzu once proposed, “to fight and conquer in all battles is not 
supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists of breaking the enemy’s 
resistance without resorting to fighting” (Giles, 2003).  IGASOM should exploit 
every available opportunity which avoids the shedding of blood.  As the situation 
now stands, the TFG remains feeble and isolated in Baidoa.  Its future relies on 
the international community recognizing the fight it must wage.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In order to bolster the TFG, I recommend the following: 
• The arms embargo imposed on Somalia by the UN in 1992 should 
be lifted. 
• IGASOM should be deployed to Somalia in order to assist the TFG 
in resettling.  While doing so, IGASOM should also assist the TFG 
in rebuilding Somalia and training the Somali security forces.  
• The UN and the international community should pressure the ICC 
to surrender their arms and cease military activities against the 
TFG. They should also impose severe sanctions on external 
supporters of the ICC. 
• The UN and the international community should support IGAD in 
achieving their goals in Somalia. 
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